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632 GRAY V. SOUTHERN PACIFIC CO. [23 C.2d 
[Sac. No. 5620. LD Bank. Feb. I, 1944.] 
MARY ELLEN GRAY, as Administratrix, etc., Appellant, 
v. SOUTHERN PACIFIC COMPANY (a Corporation) 
R~oo~~ , 
[la-Ic]. Master and ~ervant-Federal Employers' Liability Act-
EVldence-Sufficlency.-In an action under the 11'ederal E -
ployers' Liability Act (45 U.S.C.A., §§ 51-59) for thl' de::b 
o~ a brakeman whos~ severed arm and body were found respec-
tively under the thlrty-fifth and fortieth cars of defendant's 
SIXt~-two car freight train after it came to a stop shortly after 
~ullIng out fron;'- a station, the evidence would support an 
mference or findmg that the brakeman was on the thirty-fifth 
car. and that the stopping of the train was the cause of the 
a.ccIdent, where the train traveled five car lenO"ths from the 
time of the application of air brakes and the :top i where it 
w~s the brakeman's custom and practice to inspect the first 
thIrty-four to. thirty-five cars from the ground, and then to 
board the tram at that point i and where be was an experi-
enced and a~le workman, and was familiar both with the 
tracks and wIth the character of the train involved. 
[2a, 2b] Id.-Fe~eral Employers' Liability Act-Questions of Fact. 
-In an actIOn under the l!'ederal Employers' Liability Act 
for the dea~h of a brakeman, where there was evidence to 
su~port an mference or finding that the brakeman was on the 
thIrty-fifth .car .of defendant's freight train and that there 
wa~ a defimte lInk of causation between the stopping of the 
tram and the brakeman's fall from said car, evidence that 
the brakeman fell, before the stop, from the second or fourth 
car, that blood was found on the wheels of the second to the 
fifth .cars! and .that the brakeman's duties did not include 
a rollm.g ll~spectIon ?f the first thirty-five cars, merely created 
a . confilCt m the e~Idence or involved the credibility of the 
wItn~sses or the . weIght of the evidence, and were matters for 
the JUry to conSIder. 
[3a, 3~]. ~d.-Federal Employers' Liability Act-Evidence-Admis-
slblbty.-In an action under the Federal Employers' Liability 
Act for the death of a brakeman, evidence of a former rail-
ro.ad employee of defendant, testifying in plaintiff's behalf 
WIth regard to the duties of a head braKeman such as the 
deceased, that four years prior to the accide~t it was the 
McK. Dig. References: [1, 6J Master and Servant, § 204(5) . 
[2] Ma~ter and Servant, § 204(6); [3] Master and Servant' 
§ 204(4) , [4J Appeal and Error, §106Sj [5] Evidence §§555(1/ 
563; [7] Evidence, § 525; [8] Appeal and Error, § 1094. ' 
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brakeman's practice and custom, when a freight train pulled 
out of a station, to inspect the first thirty-five cars from thE.' 
ground, was admissible and relevant, where defendant's fire-
man testified that, whatever the practice might have been four 
years previously, it remained the same thereafter, and where 
defendant's written rules were consistent with the cor..struc-
tion that brakemen generally were required to make a rolling 
inspection and pass signals. 
[4] Appeal- Persons Urging Errors - Respondent. - Generally, 
a respondent may not be heard on appeal to complaiN of the· 
improper admission of evidence. 
[5] Evidence-Province to Determine Oredibility: Weight of Oir-
cumstantial Evidence.-It is the province of the jury to dis-
believe any testimony which appears to them to lack verit]. 
They may reject positive testimony and accept circumstantial 
evidence as proof of the facts. 
[6a, 6b] Master and Servant-Federal Employers' Liability Act-
Evidence-Sufficiency.-In an action under the Federal Em-
ployers' Liability Act for the death of a brakeman, the evi-
dence supported an implied finding of the jury t.hat the brake-
man was thrown from a freight train as a result of defen-
dant's negligence in stopping the train shortly after it pulled 
out from a station, where such a stop. was not a common 
occurrence and there was nothing to indicate that the brake-
man was aware that a stop was going to be made, where the 
stop was not for any emergency and the block signal showed 
a clear track ahead, where no notice or warning of the stop 
was given, and where, in view of the brakeman's practice to 
making a rolling inspection of the train and board about the 
thirty-fifth car, the engineer should have known that the 
brakeman in the course of his ddies was on top of the train 
at the time it was stopped. 
[7] Evidence.-Opinion Evidence-Operation of Trl'ins.-In an 
action under the Federal Employers' Liability Act for the 
death of a brakeman, a former railroad man of many years' 
experience as a brakeman and conductor was qualified to 
testify as an expert what would be the action of a ear in the 
middle of a 62-car train, moving out from a station not faster 
than eight miles an hour, if the train were brought to a stop 
within five car lengths by any application of the automatic 
air throughout the train. 
[8] Appeal- Persons Urging Errors - Invited Error - Evidence 
Excluded.-A party may not on appeal object to Ii judgment 
141 Rce 2 Oal.Jur. 839, 840 j 3 Am.Jur. 403. 
[8] See 2 Oal.Jur. 846, 847; 3 Am.Jur. 430. 
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against him because of insufficient evidentiary support where 
such. l~ck arose as a result of improper exclusion of e~idence 
at hIS mstance. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of 
Placer County. Raymond McIntosh, Judge assigned. Re-
versed with directions. 
Action under the Federal Employers I Liability Act for 
damages for wrongful death of a brakeman. Judgment for 
defendant, notwithstanding a verdict for plaintiff reversed 
with directions. ' 
. M. Mitchell Bourquin, Patrick J. Murphy and K. D . .Rob-
mson for Appellant. 
T. L. Chamberlain and Jones & Quinn for Respondent. 
. CARTER, J.-Plaintiff appeals from a judgment for de-
fendant ~otwithstanding the verdict of a jury awarding her 
damages In the sum of $15,000 in an action under the Federal 
Employers' Liability Act, (45 U.S.C.A", secs. 51-59) based 
~pon the alleged negligence of defendant in the operation of 
Its train ~es~lting in the death of Pierce L. Gray. 
. The ~aIn Issue presented is whether or not the evidence 
IS suffiCIent to sup~ort the implied finding of the jury that 
the deceased met hIS death in the course of his employment 
\ as the result of defendant's negligence. Plaintiff's theory is 
tha: t~e deceased was knocked from the top of a box car 
whilc In. the performance of his duties as a brakeman by 
the neglIgent stopping of the train without warning. 
[l~J Defendant operates a railroad through Colfax, Cali-
for~Ia. On the evening of April 10, 1934, the time of the 
acc~dent, d.efenda~t. was operating in inteMltate commerce a 
freIght tram COnsIstIng of two engines, sixty-two cars, and a 
caboose, en route easterly from Roseville, California, through 
Colfax .to Sparks, Nevada. One engine was at the head of 
the traIn, and the other, a helper, four cars ahead of the 
cab~ose. Thc first thirty-five cars following the head loco-
motive ~ere b?x cars. At Colfax the facilities for supplying 
the. engmes WIth water are located on the south side of the 
ma~n t.rllck ab~ut 20 feet f'ast of an express company shed 
WhICh In turn IS about IOU feet east of the depot. Th~ train 
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arrived at Colfax at 9 :45 at night; the weather was clear, 
the night was dark and it was dry and warm .. In stopping 
to take on water, the lead engine was uncoupled and pro-
ceeded 8.lbout 100 feet to the water column. The watering 
operations were completed, and at 10 p. m. the train pulled 
out of Colfax. After it had proceeded 40 to 50 car lengths 
and attained a speed of about eight miles per hour, it was 
brought to a stop by the engineer in the lead engine by the 
application of air throughout the train. The train traveled' 
about· 250 feet or about five car lengths from the time the 
air brakes were applied before it stopped. Following the 
stop, deceased was found dead, his head and left forearm 
having been scvered from his body. His body was found at 
about the fortieth car from the head of the train;' his fore-
arm was found leaning against the inside of the south rail 
of the tracks under the thirty-fifth car. There thus were 
five cars betwecn his body and arm, or the same distance 
that the train traveled from the time of the application of 
the brakes to the stop.. From the leaning position of the 
forearm it is reasonable to infer that no wheel of the train 
passed over the place where the arm was lying after it reached 
that position inasmuch as the £lange on the wheel would have 
moved it. From these circumstances it may be dednced that 
the deceased was at the thirty-fifth car from the head of the 
train at the time of the occurrence of the event that caused 
his death and it is probable that the deceased's nrm had 
been dragged along by the thirty-fifth car until the train 
came to a full stop. Moreover, other circumstances place him· 
at that point and also indicate that he had boarded the train. 
There were four brakemen on the train, one of whom, the 
head brakeman, was the deceased. At and. before the time 
of the accident it was the deceased's duty . togo' upon 'and 
walk along and over moving freight cars. There is evidence 
that the custom or practice was for the head brakeman, under 
the circumstances presented, to inspect the first half, or the 
first thirty-four to thirty-five cars of the train from the 
ground as it rolled out of the station, giving special attention 
to whether the brakes were sticking on the wheels of any 
of the cars or whether any wheels were sliding. After the 
portion of the train subject to his inspection had rolled past, 
he would board the train, going on top of the cars to give 
lIr receive signals. It is wholly reasonable to conclude that 
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those duties, had inspected his portion of the train and 
boarded the thirty-fifth car. That conclusion is consistent 
with evidence which is susceptible of the interpretation that 
the maximum speed of eight miles per hour for a train pull-
ing out of a station is designed to enable trainmen who are 
making a rolling inspection from the ground to board the 
train after completion of that duty. Also, the evidence shows 
that deceased was characterized as an excellent brakeman. 
always ",Villing to do his part and was active and competent, 
hence, bkely to be performing his duties. The foregoing 
circumstances are sufficient to place decedent on the thirty. 
fifth car and sustain the inference that he fell from that car. 
With reference to the presence of deceased on the train, 
without regard to the particular portion thereof defendant 
admits in its answer that at the time of the ~ccident de-
ceased was on the top of one of the freight cars of the train 
in the course of his employment and that he was run over 
b?the train.. Thus, if the defendant was negligent in stop-
pmg the tram and that negligence was the proximate cause 
o~ his death, there is sufficient evidence to support the ver-
dICt. The foregoing circumstances clearly furnish a basis 
for concluding that the stopping of the train was the cause 
of the a~cident, par~i~ularly the location of the body and 
the 10.catIOn and pOSItIOn of the forearm. They reasonably 
estahlIsh as a fact that the accident occurred while the train 
was in the process of stopping. 
[2a] Defendant contends that the only substantial evi-
dence Supports its version of the accident, that is, that de. 
ceased fell before the stop from the top of the second or 
fourth car behind the lead engine while crossing without a 
lantern from one car to another en route to the engine and 
hence no asserted negligen~e of defendant in making the stop 
could have caused the aCCIdent. It points to evidence that 
when the train arrived in Colfax to take on water the de. 
ceased assisted in that operation by uncoupling and later 
Coupling the lead engine; that he left a restaurant near the 
t:acks when the train was starting and the engine crew tes-
tIfied that he boarded and moved to the top of the second or 
fourth car from the lead engine, having no lantern with him. 
that blood was found on the wheels of the second to fifth 
car~; that all. the witnesses who qualifiedly testified on the 
sub.loct. establIshed that the deceased's duties as head brake-
man dId not include a roiling inspection or the train and 
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that he was supposed to board and ride the lead engine when 
it left Colfax. 
The most that can be said of such eviden~e is th~t. i: cre· 
ated a conflict in the evidence or involved the credIbIhty of 
the witnesses or the weight of the evidence, all matters 
which were resolved against defendant by the jury and with 
which we are not concerned on appeal. [lb] In addition to 
the circumstances heretofore related as supporting the jury's 
verdict there are other circumstances which mitigate against 
defend~nt 's version of the accident. Although it was a dark 
night the weather was warm and dry and as far as appears 
the cars were in /tood condition. Deceased was a brakeman 
of many years' experience, was an alert, agile and able work-
man, a~d the tracks traversed were in g~od condition and 
decedent was familiar with them and the character of the 
train involved. All of th('se circumstances carry inferences 
which rebut the assumption that deceased fell when going 
from the top of one car to another without the intervention 
of any unusual occurrence. 
It must be remembered that practically all of the wit-
nesses were employees of the defendant and thus cannot 
be said to be disinterested witnesses. With reference to the 
duty of decedent to make a rolling inspection of the fore part 
of the train it is true that Reveral of defendant's employees 
testified that the head brakeman had no such duties at the 
time of the accident with respect to any part of the train. 
The jury could have disbelieved those witnesses. One of 
them testified that there was no rule prohibiting a head brake-
man from riding on top of the train, that is, that it was not 
mandatory that he ride in the cab of the engine. Another 
stated it was up to the brakeman whether he rode on top 
of the train rather than in the engine cab. The conductor 
on the train testified that he observed a brakeman near the 
head of the train when it was moving out and a rolling in-
spection was made. He stated that it was Hatch, another 
brakeman not Gray. But although Hatch stated on direct 
examinati~n that he had made a rolling inspection of the 
whole train, his testimony in this regard was substantially 
impeached by inferences which may be drawn from other 
evidence. From his testimony on direct examination it may 
be inferred that he stood or squatted in one spot near the 
rails and watched the wheels of every car of the entire train 
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as it passed him. But it is established that the train com. 
prised two engines, 62 cars and the caboose, that it had rolled 
only 40 to 50 car lengths when the airbrakes were suddenly 
applied for the irregular stop, and that it rolled only about 
five car lengths more before its complete stop. Therefore, from 
45 to 55 car lengths was as far as the train moved at the 
time in question. It did not move its entire length. At 
least seven cars plus the helper engine plus the caboose had 
not yet passed Hatch when the train had come to a full stop 
if he started his inspection at the first car. But he said he 
boarded the caboose and that this was done while the train 
was stilI in motion. If that part of his testimony is true 
then it seems to be a reasonable inference that he was not 
the, brakeman who inspected the front part of the train. It 
is therefore reasonable to conclude that the brakeman mak. 
ing the rolling inspection of the fore part of the train was 
deceas~d, not Hatch, the other members of the crew being 
otherWISe engaged. [Sa] Plaintiff produced a witness Wait 
whose credibility is vigorously attacked by defendant wh~ 
testified with regard to the duties of a head brakema~ such 
as deceased to make a rolling inspection under the given cir. 
cumstr.nces. His testimony cannot be said to have been de. 
stroy~d. He was a former railroad man of many years' 
experIence as a brakeman and otherwise, and had experience 
prior to the date of tho accident on the run here in question 
havinf.! been an employee of defendant. He testified that it 
was the practice and custom for the head brakeman to make 
a :olling inspection under the circumstances here presented 
prIOr to 1930, four years before the accident. Defendant's 
firem~n on the lead engine testified that the practice had 
remaIned the same during many years prior to 1930 and' 
thereafter. However, his view of the practice was contrary 
~o .Wait's. The question of credibility was for the jury and 
It IS unnecessary to discuss in detail the various attacks UpOl1 
~t made by defendant. . It is contended, however, that it was 
Improperly admitted because there was no foundation laid 
establishing that the practice was the same in 1930 as in 1934 
~he da~ of. the accident; that the fireman's testimony wa~ 
InSUffiCIent In that respect because he testified to a contrary 
custom. [4] Generally, the respondent may not be heard on 
appeal to complain of the improper admission of evidence. 
(See 2 Cal.Jur. 839-840.) [Sb] Nevertheless, we believe that 
thc evidence was admissible and relevant under the circum-
Feb. 1944] GRAY V. SOU'l'HERN PACIFIC CO. 
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stances in the instant case. Wait had many years' railroad 
experience and had experience as a brakeman in the op~ra­
tion of trains at the place involved in the instant actIon. 
Although the fireman testified that the practice imposed no 
duty of rolling inspection on the head brakeman, he also tes-
tified : "Q. Then you may be understood to ~ay that the 
practice in 1934 was the same as '33, '32, '29, rIght o~ back 
through your experience? A. Yes, sir. Q. Whatever 1.1 was, 
it was the same? A. Yes sir." (Emphasis added.) The 
jury could have disregarded the fireman 's testi~ony as to 
the exact practice, and accepted the part that It wa~ the 
same prior to 1930 as it was at the time of the acc~dent. 
Moreover the written rules of the company may be Inter· 
preted a~ consistent with the requirement that brake~en 
generally, not referring to any particular. one, are reqUIred 
to make It rolling inspection and pass SIgnals. . The ru~es 
'limit the speed of trains to eight miles per hour f?r a dI~­
tance to permit a rolling inspection and each tramman 18 
responsible for the wheels of the portion of the train und?r 
his charge. Trainmen must be so distributed over the t:am 
"as to ('.Ontrol it most effectively." The fireman testIfied 
that it is n brakeman's duty to be in a position to pass signals 
while a train is in motion. 
[2b] In regard to the location and position of ,decedent's 
arm in relation to the thirty-firth car and .the presence of 
decedent's body at the rortieth car from the head of the train, 
the evidence referred to by defendant does nothing more than 
create a conflict. Although there may be some conflict in 
the fireman's testimony or uncertainty in its me~ning, he 
testified that he walked back ftom the lead engine along the 
south side of the train 15 to 20 cars, then seeing a lantern 
on the north side crossed over and continued to theStaIldard 
Oil crossing, where he fonnd the arm. He then 'stated, which 
in the light of his foregoing testimony may be said to ~ean! 
that the arm and the Standard Oil crossing were at the thirty. 
fifth car from the engine: 'I Q. Did you then walk back to 
the Standard Oil CrossingY A. Yes. Q. It was then that 
you found the arm of Pierce Gray Y A. Yes sir. Q. How 
many cars was that back from the Standard Oil Crossing' 
A.. I should judge about 35." That interpretation is fur· 
ther fortified by the fireman's testimony that he did not 
proceed beyond the Standard Oil crossing, but returned to 
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the lead engine after finding the arm. Moreover, there is 
evidence that the helper engine, when the train was stopped, 
was on the Grass Valley grade crossing, and with it in that 
position, considering the make-up of the train and the dis-
tance between the Standard Oil crossing, where the arm was 
found, and the Grass Valley crossing, the thirty-fifth car 
would be resting at the former crossing. The position of the 
arm with respect to the south rail of the track, that position 
being such that no wheel of the car could have passed by it 
without moving it is clearly shown by the evidence. The 
conductor testified at the trial that the C C arm was laying 
up on the, on this fill, up against the right rail of the number 
two track, that is the main line track. Q. Which rail was 
that, the right rail Y A. The right rail, yes sir." He was 
called as plaintiff's witness and was impeached because of 
surprise by plaintiff by his testimony at the coroner's in-
quest. Nevertheless, he admitted he testified at the inquest: 
" C Do you recall which arm and hand was found at the cross-
ing? A. I believe it was the left. Q. That was found in 
between the rails, was it? A. Yes, leaning up against the 
right rail.' Did you so testify at the coroner's inquest Y A. I 
believe I did, yes .. " Mr. Bourquin: Q. Will you answer, 
Mr. Lytle, was that true, when you gave that testimony at 
the inquest? A. I told it for the truth, yes sir." The fire-
man testified: ceQ. Whereabouts was the arm that you saw 
with respect to the rails upon which you were travellingf 
A. It was on the south rail, just inside where the flange 
tread, laying up against the rail where the flange tread was. " 
That testimony wa.."l clearly susceptible of the interpretation 
by the jury that the arm was in the position heretofore de-
scribed. There is conflicting evidence by the same witness 
on the subject, but its credibility and the conclusion to be 
drawn therefrom was for the jury. 
The evidence of blood spots on the wheels heretofore 
referred to is asserted as substantiating defendant's theory 
and completely refuting plaintiff's version. The spots claimed 
to have been discovered by the conductor on his first inspec-
tion of the fifth car' were very small and a later inspection 
was not made until after the train reached Nevada. Defen-
dant also calls attention to the fact that Gray's lantern was 
not found, but this was another circumstance for the jury 
to consider in the determination of the issues of fact. 
[5] In determining the disputed questions of fact pre-
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sented at the trial of the case it was the province of the jury 
to disbelieve any testimony which appeared to theI?- :~ lack 
verity. They were the exclusivc judges of the ~redlbI!Ity of 
the witnesses and the weight to be given theIr testimony. 
They could reject positive testimony and accept circumstan-
tial evidence as proof of the facts, as it is eleme~tary that 
direct evidence may be disbelieved and contra:y Clrcums~an­
tial evidence relied upon to support a verdIct or findmg. 
(Barha.m v. Widing, 210 Cal. 206 [291 P. 173] ; Parsons v. 
Easton 184 Cal. 764 [195 P. 419].) 
[10]' The foregoing discussion has t~ do with the m.ann~r 
and place in which the deceased met hIS death. There IS eVI-
dence from which an inference may be drawn that he .was on 
the thirty-fifth car, and that he fell therefrom some tIme be-
tween the application of the brakes and the stop, and that . 
there was a definite link of causation between the stop and 
the fall. [6a] It remains then to determine whether 0: not 
defendant was negligent in making the stop, and hence hable. 
There is considerable discussion in regard to , ... hether the 
stop was unusual. It is defendant's claim that the stop was 
made to ascertain the whereabouts of the deceased. There 
is evidence that such a stop was not a common occurrence 
and certainly it was not to be expeC'tcJ ~t least .as ~ar as the 
deceascd was concerned. 'l'ltcre is notblllg' to mdleatc that 
hc was aware that a stop was going' to be made. The ntop 
was not for any emergency. 'rhe blocl;: signal showeJ a clear 
track ahead. The engineer testified that: "Q. Gave .you a 
clear signal, and you got a denr signal from th<.~ block Signal? 
A. Yes. Q. In other words from thc time yon p!l.ss~d tho 
block signal, you had no rcason to expect any necc:;sIty to 
stop is that the inea Y A. Y ps. " Hatch, a brakeman, tp~­
tified: "Q. Mr. Hatch, you boarded the train leaving Col-
fax on the caboose, is that right Y A. What is that Y Q. 
When the train started up at Colfax, did you board on the 
cabooseY A. yes.... Q. Mr. Hatch, after the train ~ad 
stopped at Colfax and taken water and made preparatIOns 
to leave, you, as brakeman, didn't expect that any stop woul~ 
be made pulling out of there, did you 7 A. No, not ordI-
narily. . .. Q. Mr. Hatch, the fact that a ~rain did stop at 
the plaee thiS was brought to a stop, lcavlllg Colfax that 
night after the train had stopped at Colfax and taken water 
230.2d-.21 
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and prepared to move on, was an unusual thing, wasn't it T 
A. Yes, ordinarily, it was." No notice or warning of the 
stop was given. A rule of the defendant referring ~o the 
various whistle signals indicates a short blast" apply brakes, 
stop. " One of the crew testified that that meant: "Long, 
short blast of the whistle sounded by the engineer, signify-
ing to the trainmen that he wants help to stop the train with, 
that for some reason that the air brakes on the train have 
come partially or wholly in-operative, and that he is not able 
to control the speed of the train, or to stop the train as he 
wants to, and needs help." While the reference is to assis-
tance in stopping the tra.in, nevertheless it would also serve 
as a warning that a stop was to be made. The engineer on 
the helper engine stated that one short blast of the whistle 
on the lead engine means a stop and indicates the intention 
of the engineer to stop the train. Wait testified that he was 
familiar with the above mentioned rule and that upon a short 
blast of the whistle the train crew prepared for a stop. Defen. 
dant admitted in its answer that decedent was in the course 
of his duties on top of the train at the time of the accident, 
and as we have <:Ieen according to its version he was On the 
fourth car when the train started. In view of the custom 
and practice requiring the deceased to make a rolling in-
spection of the train and board about the thirty-fifth car, 
the engineer in the lead engine should have known that the 
deceased in the course of his duties was on top of the train 
at the time it was stopped. Those circumstances also nega-
tive the reason advanced by the engineer for the stop, that 
is, that it was due to the absence of deceased from the cab 
of the lead engine. While there is evidence by several wit-
nesses that the stop was gradual and easy and without a jerk 
in the cars there are circumstances from which the jury could 
have inferred that the stop would probably have caused some 
jolting. Before the stop practically all of the slack between 
the cars had been taken up. Although there is evidence that 
the proper application of the air brake.'l throughout the train 
results in a uniform braking to avoid jerking, the element of 
the slack resulting from stopping is an element to be consid-
ered. An application of air at a slow speed creates a greater 
shock than at high speed. The train was traveling about 
eight miles per hour. The helper engine four cars ahead 
. of the caboose was pushing forward to some extent. There 
is evidence that a slight rather than a proper application of 
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llir throughout the train as welJ as an independent applica· 
tion in the lead engine alone would cause a jolting and jerk-
ing. The flagman in the caboose testified that the stop was 
smooth without any jerking, but he also stated that the brakes 
were set up lightly and gently. Deceased was an able and 
active brakeman not likely to fall from the top of the car 
unless something unusual happened. Wait, a brakeman and 
conductor of many years' experience, including experience. 
on the run here involved, testified as an expert: "Q. Mr. 
Wait, what would be the action upon a car in the middle of 
a 62 car train moving out from the stop at Colfax not faster 
than eight miles an hour, with the slack stretched out fo~ a 
considerable distance behind the leading engine, and wlth 
the helper engine pushing slightly_ working steam, if that 
train were brought to a stop within five car lengths, or 250 
feet, by any application or use of the automatic air through-
out the train? . _ . A. It would be an awful jar, I'll tell 
you. It would be enough to throw a man from a box car, 
knock his feet out from under him. Mr. Jones: We move 
to strike out everything after the words 'it would be an 
awful jar'; the rest of it is going into the realm of specula.-
tion and conclusion again. The Court: Very well, it mil:, 
go out." (Emphasis added.) From the foregoing evidence 
it is clear that it could be concluded that defendant was 
negligent in the process of making the stop and that that 
negligence caused the death of decedent. 
[7] Defendant asserts, however, that the foregoing tes-
timony of Wait cannot be considered by this court .. Clearly 
Wait was qualified to testify as an expert from. hIS many 
years' experience. The matter concer~hig which. ~e tes:ifi:d 
was a proper subject for expert testimony. It Is.sa}d m 
Peters v. Southern Pacific 00., 160 Cal. 48, 66 [116 P .. 400] : 
"The management and operation of trains is a matter out-
Ride the experience and kn~wledge of ordina~y juro;,s,. an.d 
it is, therefore, a proper subJect for expert testlmony. ThlS 
court held in the recent case of Newkirk v. Los Angeles Junc-
tion Ry. 00., 21 Ca1.2d 308 [131 P.2d 535], that the effect 
a loose condition would have upon the operation of a brake 
on a train was the proper subject of expert testimony_ The 
question put to Wait included sufficient facts which were 
established upon which to base his opinion. It does not 
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accident, were any different from those in use during Wait's 
experience prior to 1930. 
[8] Upon defendant's motion the foregoing testimony 
of ~ait was stricken from the record. Nevertheless, defen-
ant IS not now in a position to complain of its consideration 
on this appeal in support of the verdict. A party may not 
object to a judgment against hi:n because of insufficient evi-
dentiary support where such lack arose as the result of the 
improper exclusion of evidence at his instance. It is so held 
where one party appeals from a judgment urging insufficiency 
of the evidence to support it. If the evidence necessary to 
support the judgment was erroneously excluded at the in-
stance of appellant the judgment will be nevertheless affirmed. 
(Kelso v. Slosburg, 120 Cal.App. 479 [8 P.2d 158] ; Crinella 
v. Northwestern Pac. R. R. Co., 85 Cal.App. 440 [259 P. 774] ; 
Truschel v. Rex Amusement Co., 102 W. Va. 215 [136 S.E. 
30]; Missouri, K. &; T. Ry. Co. v. Elliott, 102 F. 96 
[42 C.C.A. 188]; see 3 Am.Jur. Appeal & Error, sec. 
879; 5 C.J.S. Appeal & Error, sec. 1506; 2 Cal.Jur. 
846-847; Chamberlain Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 51 
Cal.App.2d 520 [125 P.2d 113]; Martin v. Postal Union 
Life Ins. Co., 16 Cal.App.2d 570 [61 P.2d 333] . Hansen v. 
California Bank, 17 Cal.App.2d 80 [61 P.2d 794] ; Ralph v. 
Anderson, 187 Cal. 45 [200 P. 940] ; Wells v. Zenz, 83 Cal. 
App. 137 [256 P. 484] ; Credit C. Bureau v. Guaranty L. Co., 
61 Cal.App. 528 [215 P. 104] ; Harp v. Harp, 136 Cal. 421 
[69 P. 28].) [6b] Under the circumstances we think it is 
clear that the jury was justified in concluding that defendant 
was negligent and that its negligence was the proximate 
cause of the accident. 
On January 17, 1944, the Supreme Court of the United 
States render cd its decision in the case of Tennant v. Peoria 
and Pekin Union Railway Company, in which decision the 
function of the court and jury in the trial of a case arising 
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act is discussed. 
The court said: 
"In order to recover under the Federal Employers' Lia-
bility Act, it was incumbent upon petitioner to prove that 
respondent was negligent and that such negligence was the 
proximate cause in whole or in part of the fatal accident. 
(Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 318 U.S. 54, 67 [63 
S.Ot. 444, 87 L.Ed. 610, 143 A.L.R. 967].) Petitioner was 
required to present probative facts from which the negligence 
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and the causal relation could reasonably be inferred. 'The 
essential requirement is that mere speculation be not allowed 
to do duty for probative facts, after making due allowance 
for all reasonably possible inf·erences favoring the party 
whose case is attacked.' (Galloway Vi United States, 319 
U.S. 372, 395 [63 S.Ot. 1077, 87 L.Ed. 1458]; Atchison, 
Topeka &; Santa Fe R. Co. v. Toops, 281 U.S. 351 [50 S.Ot. 
281, 74 L.Ed. 896].) If that requirement is met as we be-
lieve it was in this case, the issues may properly b~ presented 
to t~e jury. No court is then justified in substituting its con-
clUSIOns for those of the twelve jurors .... 
"The court below erred, however, in holding that there 
was not sufficient proof to support the charge that respon-
dent's negligence in failing to ring the bell was the proxi-
mate cause of Tennant's death. The absence of eyewitnesses' 
was not decisive. There was testimony that his duties in-
cluded staying near the north or rear end of the engine as 
it made its backward movement out of track B-28. The loca-
tion of his severed hand, cap, lantern and the pool of blood 
was strong e,,-idence that he was killed approximately at the 
point where the engine began this backward movement and 
where he might have been located in the performance of his 
duties. To this evidence must be added the presumption that 
the deceased was actually engaged in the performance of 
those. duties ~nd exercised due care for his own safety at 
the tIme of hIS death. (Looney v. Metropolitan R. Co., 200 
U.S. 480, 488 [26 S.Ot. 303, 50 L.Ed. 564] ; Atchison, Topeka 
&; Santa Fe R. Co. v. Toops, supra, 356; New Aetna Portland 
Cement Co. v. Hatt, 231 F. 611, 617 [145 C.C.A. 497].) In 
additioll, the evidence relating to the rule and custom of 
ringing a bell 'when an engine is about to move' warranted 
a finding that Tennant was entitlcd to rely on such a warn-
ing under these circumstances. The ultimate inference that 
Tennant would not have been killed but for the failure to 
w~rn him is therefore supportable. The ringing of the bell 
mIght well have saved his life. The jury could thus find 
that respondent was liable 'for ... death resulting in whole 
or,!n part f~om the negligence of any of the ... employees.' 
In holdmg that there was no evidence upon which to 
base the jury's inference as to causation, the court below 
e~p~asize~ other inferences which are suggested by the con-
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assume that Tennant was standing on the track north of the 
engine in the performance of his duties. It seemed more 
probable to the court that he seated himself on the footboard 
of the engine and fell asleep. Or he may have walked back 
unnoticed to a point south of the engine and been killed 
while trying to climb through the cars to the other side of 
the track. These and other possibilities suggested by 
diligent counsel for respondent all suffer from the same lack 
of direct proof as characterizes the one adopted b~ .. the jury. 
But to the extent that they involve a disobedience of duty 
by Tennant no presumption in their favor exists. Nor can 
any possible assumption of risk or contributory negligence 
on Tennant's part be presumed in order to negate an infer-
ence that death was due to respondent's negligence. 
"It is not the function of a court to search the record 
for conflicting circumstantial evidence in order to take the 
ca.se away from the jury on a theory that the proof gives 
equal support to inconsistent and uncertain inferences. The 
focal point of judicial review is the reasonableness of the 
particular inference or conclusion drawn by the jury. It is 
the jury, not the court, which is the fact-finding body. It 
weighs the contradictory evidence and inferences, judges the 
credibility of witnesses, receives expert instructions, and 
draws the ultimate conclusion as to the facts. The very 
essence of its function is to select from among conflicting 
inferences and conclusions that which it considers most rea-
sonable. (Washington &- Georgetown R. 00. v. McDade, 135 
U.S. 554, 571, 572 [10 S.Ct. 1044, 34 L.Ed. 235] ; Tiller v. 
Atlantic Ooast Line R. 00., sttpra, 68; Bailey v. Oentral Ver-
mont Ry., 319 U.S. 350, 353, 354 [63 S.Ct. 1062, 87 L.Ed. 
1444].) That conclusion, whether it relates to negligence, 
causation or any other factual matter, cannot be ignored. 
Courts are not free to reweigh the evidence and set aside 
the jury verdict merely because the jury could have drawn 
different inferences or conclusions or because judges feel that 
other results are more ree,sonable. 
"Upon an examination of the record we cannot say that 
the inference drawn by this jury that respondent's negligence 
caused the fatal accident is without support in the evidence. 
Thus to enter a judgment for respondent notwithstanding 
the verdict is to deprive petitioner of the right to a jury 
trial. No reason is apparent why we should abdicate our 
duty to protect and guard that right in this case. We accord-
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ingly reverse the judgment of the court below and remand 
the case to it for further proceedings not inconsistent with 
this opinion." 
The judgment is reversed and the court below is instructed 
to enter judgment on the verdict. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J., and Schauer, J., con-
curred. 
TRAYNOR, J., Dissenting.-It is my opinion that the evi~ 
dence is insufficient to warrant a finding by a reasonable jury 
that it is more probable than not that the deceased met his 
death in the course of his employment as the result of defen-
dant's negligence. 
[Sac No. 5630. In Bank. Feb. 1, 1944.] 
F. SHEALOR, Respondent, v. CITY OF LODI et at, 
Appellants. 
[la, Ib] Police-Pensions-Construction of Statute.-The statute 
of 1889 governing police relief and pensions (Stats. 1889, p. 
56 j Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 6012), is enabling legislation 
authorizing a city to make provision for a relief or pensiolt 
fund rather than a mandatory enactment creating one. 
[2] Constitutional Law-Constitutionality of Statutes-Construe-, 
tion.-If a statute is susceptible of two oonstructions, one of 
which will render it constitutional and the other will render 
it unconstitutional in whole or in part, or will' raise serious 
and doubtful constitutional questions, such as the imposi-
tion of a tax on a municipality in violation of Const., art. 
XI, § 12, the court will adopt that construction which, with· 
out doing violence to the reasonable construction of the lan-
guage used, will render the statute valid in its entirety, or 
free from doubt as to its constitutionality. 
[3] Administrative Law-Judicial Review-"'Decisions In.terpreting 
Statute: Police-Pensions-Construction of Statute.-Admin-
istrative construction of an ambiguous statute will be accorded 
[2] See 5 Ca1.Jur. 615j 11 Am.Jur. 725. 
Melt. Dig. References: [1] Police, § 22; [2] Constitutional Law, 
§ 51 j (3] Administrative Law; Police, § 22. 
